China’s recent efforts to win popular support at home have shown a surge in its public diplomacy activities. Social media activities in China have gained significance, in recent years, with the mounting interactions with the domestic public. China’s use of social media platforms like WeChat and Weibo are typical examples. The Foreign Ministry of the PRC launched a social media platform Weibo in May this year. Similarly, the Ministry had opened an account on WeChat six months ago. All these actions imply a more pro-active approach in China’s domestic public diplomacy and, perhaps, signal its commitment to boost its appeal to the domestic audience including the Chinese diaspora. Understandably, these social media platforms are being used for multiple purposes—integrated activities such as informing, sensitizing, reaching out and mobilizing. For instance, amid the ongoing trade war, China has issued circulars to its citizens, informing them of the ongoing issues as well as warning against the risks and problems of travelling to the US (The Associated Press 2019).
Why is China doing this? What exactly are the factors for this scramble for favourable domestic public opinion?
New Turn in Public Diplomacy?
Reasonably, the ongoing trade war with the US can be seen as the major reason for China’s immediate push for the domestic turn. China is well aware that a protracted trade war will have serious implications for the country’s economy. The prevailing tit-for-tat attitude from both sides has gone to an alarming extent of escalating conflicts between them . The latest indicator is the verbal battle at the Shangri La Dialogue between the US Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan and his Chinese counterpart Defence Minister Wei Fenghe. Following the Shangri La, China warned the US of dire consequences if the US is to continue what China believes an attack on China’s development interests. People’s Daily, an official mouthpiece of the CPC recently wrote: “We advise the US side not to underestimate the Chinese side’s ability to safeguard its development rights and interest. Don’t say we didn’t warn you!” (Auerback 2019). Analysts noted that the phrase – “don’t say we didn’t warn you!” was previously issued only two times and both the times it was followed by war – 1962 war with India and the 1979 China-Vietnam war (Villasanta 2019)
Even though such nationalistic rhetoric can comfortably gain public support in the domestic realm, the reaction is quite different from the international audience. While the hyper-nationalistic domestic public in the country may support China’s hardline stance and expect China to feed their nationalistic pride, the international audience seems wary of China’s bellicose posture in foreign and defense policy (Wong 2019).
As noted by Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo, a senior fellow at the People’s Liberation Army’s Academy of Military Sciences and a Public Diplomacy veteran, “If you are tough the domestic audience will be satisfied, but it won’t bode well with the international audience. But if we appear to be soft, we will be the target of overwhelming criticism at home” (Wong 2019). It remains to be seen how Beijing will reconcile between the two.
Nonetheless, it can be reasonably presumed that, to a great extent, China can rely on its coercive strategic state control over the media in the country to propagate its approach to the domestic audience. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ recent embrace of Weibo in some way can contribute towards this end. However, one cannot reasonably overlook the fact that in the deepening tensions, China may be forced to take tough decisions beyond the means of diplomatic talks and negotiations. Therefore, support from the international community and from its own citizenry is all the more important. Towards this end, over the past few months, China has virtually tightened its grip over public diplomacy activities.
Moreover, apart from these variables, frequent corruption cases at various levels of government and bureaucracy have been a chronic issue that China could not get any better despite several measures putting in place over the years. Amid the surging criticism against alleged corruption involved in the Belt-Road Initiative(BRI) – China’s ambitious project of connecting the world by building a China-centred trading network – CCP is forced to instill public confidence in the domestic public. Since the BRI is to take place in a complex web of international relations and domestic economy, it is important for the government to win the confidence of the people.
Similarly, the growing debt of the local governments and state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) has become a major challenge that can trigger an internal financial crisis and can spark wide public resentment. As Haibin Zhu, JP Morgan chief China economist puts it, China’s debt is a “key source of vulnerability” (Bray 2018). If the ongoing trade war is to remain longer, many believe, it is likely to have far greater consequences to China’s economy and might bring about a loss of public confidence even resulting in potentially losing the legitimacy of the CPC in the eyes of the people (Trigkas 2018). In such a scenario, “CCP is well aware that it must be prepared for the worst possible scenario” (Purayil 2019). Therefore, engaging the domestic audience through public diplomacy is inevitable for strengthening economic and foreign policies (Ibid).
Ultimately, even though China is not a democracy, public opinion still weighs to a great extent. In fact, the interaction between public opinion and foreign policy has deepened in the age of the internet and new media (Yang 2016). Hence, the support of the public is crucial for implementing tough policy decisions in international relations.
References
Auerback, Marshall (2019): “Chinese embargo threats ring hollow,” Asia Times, 09 June, available at https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/06/opinion/chinese-embargo-threats-ring-hollow/
Bray, Chad (2018): “Could China find itself at the centre of the next financial crisis because of its mounting debt?,” South China Morning Post, 15 September, available at https://www.scmp.com/business/article/2163897/could-china-find-itself-centre-next-financial-crisis-because-its-mounting
The Associated Press (2019): “China issues US travel alert warning of official harassment,” 04 June, available at https://abcnews.go.com/Lifestyle/wireStory/china-issues-us-travel-alert-warning-official-harassment-63469853
Trigkas, Vasilis (2018): “The U.S.’s Dangerous Miscalculation on a Chinese Debt Crisis,” Chinausfocus, 09 August, available at https://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/uss-dangerous-miscalculation-on-a-chinese-debt-crisis
Purayil, Muhsin Puthan (2019): “Why Did China’s Foreign Ministry Make Its Debut on Weibo?,” The Diplomat, 05 June, available https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/why-did-chinas-foreign-ministry-make-its-debut-on-weibo/
Villasanta, Arthur (2019): “China Threatens Retaliation Against US: ‘Don’t Say We Didn’t Warn You!’,” International Business Times, 29 May, available at https://www.ibtimes.com/china-threatens-retaliation-against-us-dont-say-we-didnt-warn-you-2796138
Wong, Catherine (2019): “Why China is struggling to win hearts abroad,” inkstone, 07 June, available at https://www.inkstonenews.com/politics/china-struggles-win-friends-abroad-while-placating-nationalists-home/article/3013540
Yang, Yifan (2016): “The Internet and China’s Foreign Policy Decision-making,” Chinese Political Science Review, 1(2), pp 352-372. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-016-0021-
